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This paper explores the role of labour market policy and institutional factors in explaining cross-national 
differences in earnings mobility across Europe in the 1990s using the European Community Household 
Panel and OECD data on institutional variables. More regulation in both labour and product markets 
emerge as sources of labour market rigidity, being positively associated with earnings immobility and 
exacerbating the adverse effects of macro-economic shocks on earnings mobility. Unionization is found 
to promote earnings mobility, effect, however, counteracted in periods with adverse macroeconomic 
shocks. Corporatism is found to promote mobility and to counteract the adverse effects of 
macroeconomic shocks on earnings mobility. The generosity of the unemployment benefit is found to 
limit the adverse effects of macroeconomic shocks on earnings mobility. 
JEL Classification: C23, D31, J31, J60, J50, J08 
Keywords: Wage Distribution, Inequality, Earnings Mobility, Labour Market Institutions; 
Labour Market Policies 
1. Introduction 
While much of the welfare literature focuses on cross-sectional inequality, the 
underlying dynamics or mobility of individuals within the distribution has significant 
implications in relation to welfare associated with being in different parts of the 
distribution. Earnings mobility represents a very important aspect for understanding 
earnings inequality.  
While earnings mobility can be welfare decreasing as a result of greater risk 
(Atkinson, Bourguignon, and Morrisson, 1992), it can also be seen as a mechanism for 
reducing long-term differentials, acting as a bridge between short-term and lifetime 
earnings inequality. For example, Friedman (1962) indicates that higher earnings 
mobility  
•  is sign of a dynamic, more flexible and efficient economy,  
•  contributes to equality of opportunity;  
•  ceteris paribus, is expected to make the distribution of lifetime income 
more equal.  
The implication of the latter comment is that through “offsetting mobility”, 
higher mobility can reduce inequality of income measured over a longer period of time, 
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such as lifetime income or “permanent” income, despite a rise in annual inequality, 
resulting in a positive impact on long-term social welfare. However, it depends on the 
trade-off between long-term inequality and income variability or risk aversion (Creedy 
and Wilhelm, 2002; Gottschalk and Spolaore, 2002).  
This study focuses on the comparative analysis of earnings mobility in Europe. Of 
course, while wider income definitions such as disposable income are better 
determinants of welfare, employee earnings are one of the most important factors of 
disposable income and thus warren a distinct examination. Also, comparative studies, by 
comparing and contrasting the situation in different countries can facilitate a greater 
understanding in relation to the structure of mobility. Nevertheless, the literature in this 
area is relatively limited with only a few consistent comparative studies on earnings 
mobility, due to the lack of sufficiently comparable panel cross-country data (Aaberge, 
Bjorklund, Jantti, Palme, Pedersen, Smith, and Wannemo, 2002; Brukhauser and 
Poupore, 1997; Brukhauser, Holtz-Eakin, and Rhody, 1997; Fritzell, 1990; OECD, 
1996, 1997; Hofer and Weber, 2002; Van Kerm, 2004). 
It is not, however, sufficient to describe the structure of earnings mobility. It is 
also instructive to understand the driving forces behind differences in earnings mobility 
across countries. Studies examining this are even scarcer. To our knowledge, the only 
example is Aaberge, Bjorklund, Jantti, Palme, Pedersen, Smith, and Wannemo (2002), 
comparing income inequality and income mobility in the Scandinavian countries and the 
U.S. during 1980-1990, to explore some of the factors driving mobility. They find that 
relative income changes are associated with changes in labour market and marital status 
in all four countries, but the U.S. record the largest magnitude of such changes. Thus 
there is a large gap in the literature analysing the factors shaping earnings mobility.  
Our paper attempts to fill part of this gap by exploring the role of labour market 
policy and institutional factors in understanding cross-national differences in earnings 
mobility across 14 EU countries. So far, at the EU level, no study explored the driving 
factors behind this labour market outcome in a comparative manner.  
In our study, mobility is regarded as the opposite of persistency, and can be 
interpreted as the opportunity for the poor to improve their relative income position in 
a lifetime perspective. We do not take the stand that mobility is necessarily good, but 
that the lack of it is bad, as it signals a lack of opportunity to move in the earnings 
distribution over the lifetime: in the absence of mobility the same individuals are stuck 
at the bottom of the distribution, hence annual earnings differentials are transformed 
into lifetime earnings differentials. Understanding the factors that enhance earnings 
mobility represents a step forward towards designing policies and institutions that 
enable low-wage workers to escape low-wage jobs and improve their position in the 
distribution of lifetime earnings. 
This question is highly relevant given the economic reality of the 1990s in Europe: 
the implementation of the single market (1992) and the preparation of the single 
currency (Maastricht criteria adopted in 1993) increased the pressure on the European 
labour markets to change. Starting in the early-1990s under the influence of the 1994 
OECD Job Strategy, Europe has been moving towards more flexible labour markets 
through the implementation of employment-friendly reforms, expected to worsen the 
trade-off between a strong employment performance and a more equal distribution of  
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earnings (OECD, 2004). The pace of change, however, was different across Europe 
(Palier, 2010), reinforcing the expectation of increased country-heterogeneity with 
respect to the labour market structure and the distribution of labour market income 
across Europe.  
Using the predicted earnings mobility from Sologon and O’Donoghue (2010a) 
and Sologon (2010) together with OECD data on institutional factors for 14 EU 
countries, we apply a nonlinear least squares method to explore the relationship between 
earnings mobility and labour market policy and institutional factors.  
Our study is divided into 5 sections. Section 2 describes the comparative pattern 
of earnings mobility across Europe. Section 3 discusses the link between institutions, 
labour market shocks and earnings mobility. Section 4 uses nonlinear least squares 
regressions to assess the linkage between these factors and earnings mobility, while 
section 5 concludes. 
2. Earnings mobility 
There are a number of indicators that can be used to measure earnings mobility. 
Sologon and O’Donoghue (2010b) and Fields and Ok (1999) discuss the characteristics 
of a number of these measures, namely the Dickens, Shorrocks and Fields indicators. 
Rank measures best reflect movement in the earnings distribution between periods, 
traditionally derived from the transition matrix approach between income groups. This 
approach, however, does not capture the movement within each income group, thus 
potentially underestimating the degree of mobility. Dickens (2000a) computes the 
ranking of individuals in the wage distribution for each year and examines the degree of 
movement in percentile ranking between years. Shorrocks (1978) measures mobility as 
the relative reduction in the weighted average of single-year inequality when the 
accounting period is extended. In the literature it is usually classified among the 
measures of mobility as an equalizer of longer-term differentials. In recent years, 
however, this measure is criticised as it fails to capture the equalizing effect, failing to 
quantify the direction and the extent of the difference between inequality of longer-term 
income and inequality of base year income, treating equalizing and disequalizing changes 
in the same way (Benabou and Ok, 2001; Fields, 2008). Fields (2008) proposes an 
alternative index which captures mobility as an equalizer/disequalizer of longer-term 
incomes, circumventing the limitation of the Shorrocks index.  
In this study we wish to understand the driving factors associated with differential 
mobility across countries and over time. Most mobility indices, however, capture 
transitions between periods, which may make it difficult to link them with the yearly 
policy and institutional factors. One solution is to use a mobility index that reflects one 
particular period. Building upon the terminology introduced by Friedman and Kuznets 
(1954), individual earnings (i) in each year (t) are composed of a permanent and a 
transitory component, assumed independent of each other (Weizsacker, 1993):  
       (1) 
The permanent component of earnings reflects personal characteristics, 
education, training and other systematic elements. The transitory component reflects  
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individual random factors (e.g. illness and accident) and random changes in the market 
conditions in a particular period. It is expected to average out over time, with no 
influence on permanent earnings.  
Earnings mobility is closely related to these two components of earnings 
inequality. A large contribution of the permanent component implies that individual 
earnings are highly correlated over time and individuals do not change their income 
position to a large extent experiencing low rates of earnings mobility. Therefore, 
changes in earnings mobility are determined by the extent to which changes in cross-
sectional inequality are driven by changes in permanent or transitory variance.  
The measure of mobility is derived from decomposing earnings inequality into its 
permanent and transitory components. Taking the variance of ln(earnings) in (1), under 
the independence assumption between permanent and transitory earnings, we obtain: 
 
    (2) 
       ( 3 )  
The degree of immobility measured by the ratio between permanent and 
transitory inequality (3), in the tradition of Kalwij and Alessie (2003), is the measure of 
mobility that we use in this study. This measure offers a summary of the evolution in 
the structure of inequality: an increase in the immobility ratio indicates a decrease in 
earnings mobility, equivalent with an increase in the relative share of permanent 
differentials in the overall inequality. This mobility measure captures non-directional 
earnings movements and can be interpreted as the opportunity to improve one’s 
position in the distribution of lifetime earnings.  
Data on earnings mobility using these measures is taken from Sologon and 
O’Donoghue (2010a, 2010b) and Sologon (2010). They use the ECHP over the period 
1994-2001 for 14 EU countries. Luxembourg and Austria are observed between 1995 
and 2001 and Finland between 1996 and 2001. In the tradition of existing studies, the 
analysis focuses only on men. The mobility measures are based on real log hourly wage 
adjusted for CPI of workers aged 20 to 57, born between 1940 and 1981. The analysis 
considers only observations with hourly wage lower than 50 Euros and higher than 1 
Euro. The immobility ratio used in this paper is taken from Sologon and O’Donoghue 
(2010a) and Sologon (2010), who estimate the covariance structure of individual 
earnings using the equally weighted minimum distance estimator (Moffitt and 
Gottschalk, 1995, 1998, 2002, 2011; Baker, 1997; Dickens, 2000b; Haider, 2001; Baker 
and Solon, 2003; Kalwij and Alessie, 2003; Capellari, 2003; Ramos, 2003; Daly and 
Valletta, 2005; Gustavsson, 2007, 2008), decompose cross-sectional earnings inequality 
into permanent and transitory inequality and compute earnings immobility in each 
country. The estimation of the covariance structure is based on unbalanced samples for 
each country. The use of unbalanced panels is motivated by the need to mitigate the  
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potential overestimation of earnings persistence expected to arise in balanced panels 
where the estimation is based only on people with positive earnings for the entire 
sample period. The estimation of the two components and earnings immobility is done 
by four birth cohorts (1940-1950, 1951-1960, 1961-1970, 1971-1980) to account for 
cohort differences in both components and earnings immobility (Blundell and Preston, 
1988). For the data description and summary statistics, see Sologon and O’Donoghue 
(2010a, 2010b) and Sologon (2010). 
In summary, Table 1 reports in a comparative perspective the degree of short and 
long-term inequality (Theil) and the average 1-period mobility under alternative 
measures. Considering inequality first, short-term inequality as measured by the Theil 
index in the first wave is greater than long-term inequality, as measured by 6-period 
income, in all countries due to mobility in the earnings distribution. The rank across 
countries does not vary that much, although there are localised re-rankings within three 
groups: (a) Austria, Italy and the Netherlands, (b) Luxembourg, Greece and the UK and 
(c) France and Spain. This is driven by a combination of the change in inequality over 
time and differential mobility. 
On aggregate, conclusions in relation to mobility are reasonably robust to the 
measure used, with a rank correlation of mobility measures over 0.8. Denmark, Finland, 
and Belgium typically have the highest mobility measures, with Portugal, Luxembourg, 
and Germany having the lowest mobility. Except for the most mobile countries, a priori 
differential mobility seems to differ from typical geographical or welfare regime 
analyses. 
Also quite different welfare implications can be drawn from these statistics. 
Denmark, Finland and Belgium have among the lowest, both short and long-term 
earnings inequality, thus we may conclude mobility is relatively equalizing. Germany and 
Luxembourg meanwhile are mid-ranked under both inequality measures with relatively 
low mobility, while Portugal has the highest earnings inequality, both short and long-
term, and the lowest mobility, revealing a lack of potential for social mobility. 
These aggregate measures of mobility mask intra-population differences, for 
example between cohorts, and changes over time. The evolution of the earnings 
immobility index over time by cohort is illustrated in. Averaged across cohorts, earnings 
mobility increases in Denmark, Belgium, Spain, Netherlands and Portugal. Across 
cohorts, the degree of immobility is higher for older cohorts than for younger cohorts, 
suggesting a decreasing mobility over the lifecycle. The trend differences in immobility 
observed between cohorts may be related with the different levels of responsiveness to 
macroeconomic shocks and their interactions with the other labour market policy and 
institutional factors. Younger workers are expected to be affected to a larger extent by 
these shocks compared with experienced workers, which have a high attachment to the 
labour market and a better protection from the institutional framework. Thus younger 
cohorts are expected to experience a higher earnings volatility which translates itself into 
a higher earnings mobility.  
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Table 1. Inequality and Mobility Indicators 
  Au Be Dk Fi  Fr  Ge Gr Ir  It  Lu Nl Pt  Sp UK 
Inequality (Theil) 
1
st wave  0.067 0.062 0.042 0.052 0.132 0.082 0.095 0.129 0.065 0.101 0.056 0.158 0.131 0.101 
1
st wave – 
 6
th wave 
0.037  0.040  0.023  0.035  0.092  0.062  0.076  0.082  0.049  0.068  0.042  0.138  0.105  0.065 
Average short-term mobility (wavet- wavet+1) 
Dickens  0,218  0,233  0,272  0,259  0,179  0,185  0,219  0,224  0,229  0,134  0,194  0,177  0,226  0,211 
Shorrocks  0,079 0,080 0,110 0,106 0,066 0,052 0,075 0,071 0,068 0,044 0,074 0,037 0,063 0,079 
Fields  0,095  0,094  0,137  0,088  0,085  0,061  0,070  0,111  0,060  0,057  0,074  0,021  0,079  0,093 
Immob. 
 Ratio 
1,436 1,370 0,984 1,348 2,587 2,847 1,404 2,262 1,787 3,254 1,539 2,729 2,197 1,895 
Note: (1) Inequality is measured using individuals with positive earnings over the entire measurement horizon. 
 (2) The mobility indices are based on individuals with positive earnings in both wavet and wavet+1. 
 (3) The Shorrocks and the Fields mobility indices are based on Theil. 
 (4) For the Shorrocks, Fields and Dickens index, the average short-term measure is the average 1-period mobility over the sample period for each country.  
 (5) The Immobility Ratio is the average immobility ratio across cohorts and years. 
Source: The inequality values are from Sologon and O’Donoghue (2010a, 2010b) and Sologon (2010). The average mobility is based on our own calculations using 1-period mobility indices from 
Sologon and O’Donoghue (2010a, 2010b) and Sologon (2010).  
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1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Finland
Wage Immobility Cohort 1940-1950
Wage Immobility Cohort 1951-1960
Wage Immobility Cohort 1961-1970
Wage Immobility Cohort 1971-1981
 
Note: Immobility Ratio = Permanent Variance/Transitory Variance. Source: Processed based on the wage immobility index estimated by Sologon and O’Donoghue (2010a) and Sologon (2010) 
using ECHP data  
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3. Linking labour market policies and institutions with outcomes - 
earnings mobility 
The objective of this study is to explore the possible links between earnings 
mobility and labour market policy and institutional factors. The challenge of this 
approach is the lack of a specific theory that can explain this link. We attempt to build 
the link with earnings mobility based on existing labour market theories and empirical 
findings regarding the impact of these factors on earnings inequality. Earnings mobility 
and earnings inequality are interconnected, thus the influencing institutional and policy 
factors of earnings inequality are expected to spill-over earnings mobility. We explain 
first the determinants of earnings inequality and second we establish the link between 
labour market policy and institutional factors and earnings mobility. 
3.1 Determinants of earnings inequality  
The supply-demand-institutions framework (SDI) of Freeman and Katz (1994) 
can be used to understand how labour market policy and institutional factors influence 
wage structures. It assumes that different demographic and skill groups are imperfect 
substitutes in production, implying that shifts in labour skills demand, such as skill-
biased technological change and the forces of globalization, and supply, such as cohort 
size, access to education and immigration, can alter wage and employment outcomes. 
Supply and demand factors are expected to affect young workers to a larger extent than 
experienced workers with substantial work tenure (Freeman, 1975).  
However, demand and supply factors cannot themselves explain all differences in 
inequality as most advanced countries operate in the same world markets, with similar 
technology, industry and occupation mixes. To fully understand the differences in 
labour market outcomes across countries we need to consider the institutional 
framework (Freeman and Katz, 1994). Shocks in demand and supply may have different 
effects on wages and employment, depending on different wage-setting mechanisms and 
other labour market institutional factors. The stronger the wage-setting mechanism is, 
the less impact these shocks have on wages. For example, existing evidence shows that 
unions reduce wage inequality and that this compression effect is stronger in countries 
where union membership and bargaining coverage are high, and bargaining is 
centralised and/or co-ordinated (Aidt and Tzannatos, 2002; Blau and Kahn, 1999; 
OECD, 1997). Additionally, institutional changes, such as changes in the degree of 
unionization, the degree of centralization/co-ordination of collective bargaining, or 
product market regulation can have an impact on wage structures (Katz and Autor, 
1999).  
3.2 Linking earnings mobility with the wage structure 
Earnings mobility is closely related to the two components of earnings inequality, 
permanent and transitory, and is driven by relative changes in both. The rise in 
inequality in the permanent component of earnings may reflect increasing returns to 
education, on-the-job training and other persistent abilities that are among the main 
determinants of the permanent component of earnings, meaning enhanced relative  
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earnings position of the highly skilled individuals (Mincer, 1957, 1958, 1962, 1974; 
Hause, 1980).  
Fortin and Lemieux (1997), Topel (1997) outline a number of factors that 
determine shifts in relative demand. These include skill-biased technological changes, 
which enhance the relative earnings position of highly-skilled workers, increases in 
prices of other products, which imply changes in product demands, and forces of 
globalization, such as the reduction in trade barriers and outsourcing. Shifts in supply 
are determined by cohort variations, changes in access to education and immigration. 
An increase in the interest rate can also lead to a decrease in permanent inequality within 
younger cohorts and to an increase in permanent inequality in the older cohorts 
(Weizsacker, 1993). 
The rise of earnings instability appears to be “a bit of a puzzle for hypotheses only 
emphasizing rising skills prices associated with increased growth in the demand for skills 
relative to the supply of skills” (Katz and Autor, 1999). The increase in transitory 
inequality may be attributed to increased earnings exposure to macroeconomic shocks 
and/or a rise in the temporary workforce which increases earnings exposure to shocks, 
increased labour market instability, increased competitiveness, globalization, increasing 
international capital mobility, and to the weakening of the labour market institutions 
(e.g. unions, government wage regulation, and internal labour markets) in filtering the 
impact of these shocks on earnings (Rodrik, 1997; Katz and Autor, 1999). 
Some of the factors influencing directly permanent inequality might impact also 
transitory inequality. For example, a period of skill-biased technological change can, 
both increase the demand for skills, and increase earnings instability, as firms might face 
uncertainty with respect to abilities of individual workers (Katz and Autor, 1999). 
Overall, the increase in returns to skills is expected to have a much larger impact 
on long-run earnings inequality than an increase in transitory inequality (Katz and Autor, 
1999; Moffitt and Gottschalk, 2002). Across age groups, as postulated by Freeman’s 
(1975) “active labour market hypothesis”, similarly with overall income, supply and 
demand factors together with the other macroeconomic shocks are expected to have the 
largest effect on the youngest generations of workers. Moreover the limiting impact of 
these factors on both inequality components is expected to be lower for younger 
workers, which have a weaker attachment to the labour market compared with senior 
workers. Therefore, when analysing earnings mobility one has to take into account 
cohort heterogeneity. 
Thus, as illustrated in Figure 2, permanent inequality within birth cohorts results 
from the interactions between ability distributions, lifecycle decisions, economic 
structures and labour market policy and institutions. Transitory inequality within birth 
cohorts is expected to be driven mainly by random macroeconomic and individual-
specific shocks, and depends on the ability of labour market policy and institutions to 
minimize its increase. As the SDI factors affect overall inequality, they are expected to 
affect its permanent and transitory components, and consequently earnings mobility.  
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Figure 2: Determinants of Permanent and Transitory Inequality and Earnings Mobility 
 
 
3.3 Data description 
The link between the evolution of earnings mobility and labour market policies 
and institutions is investigated using the OECD data on labour market indicators, which 
is a combination of two datasets: the Bassanini and Duval (2006a, 2006b)
4 dataset and 
the Lindert-Allard OECD data set 1950-2001
5. The institutional variables included in 
our study are: employment protection legislation (EPL), EPL for temporary (EPLT) and 
for regular contracts (EPLR), the relative difference between EPLR and EPLT, trade 
union density, product market regulation (PMR), tax wedge, degree of corporatism, 
average unemployment benefit replacement rate (UBRR) and spending on active labour 
market programmes (ALMPs). The macroeconomic shock variables are: labour demand 
shock, terms of trade shock, total factor productivity shock, real interest shock, 
aggregate demand shock and aggregate supply shock. These variables are observed at 
the country level, over the period 1994-2001. A description of the variables is included 
in Table A.1
6 and summary statistics of the institutional and shock variables in Table A.2 
in the appendix. Luxembourg and Greece have some missing institutional/shock 
variables and they are dropped from the final estimations. Portugal, Denmark and 
Ireland record some missing values for labour demand shock.  
Figure 3 and Figure 4 offer an insight into how much labour market institutions 
vary across the 14 EU countries and how they evolved over time. There is a substantial 
heterogeneity across countries, which has the potential to explain the differences in 
earnings mobility. Over the period, the OECD index of employment protection 
legislation (EPL) decreased, although not monotonically in most countries under 
analysis. Employment protection legislation for regular contracts (EPLR) did not change 
much over time. The greatest changes are recorded for employment protection 
legislation for temporary contracts (EPLT). Over the sample period, an increasing or 
                                                 
4 The data was provided by email from the authors.  
5 http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/fzlinder/OECD%20data.html  
6 For a more detailed description, please refer to Bassanini and Duval (2006a, 2006b) and the Lindert-
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stagnant positive relative difference between EPLR and EPLT is recorded in many 
countries. Belgium and the Mediterranean countries exhibit a negative relative difference 
between EPLR and EPLT, which, decreased or remained constant over the sample 
period, except Spain. Union density decreased in nearly all countries, while the degree of 
corporatism was stable in all countries. 
The tax wedge exhibits a turnaround in 1995 for all countries, except the 
continental ones. The largest decline is in the Anglo-Saxon countries, followed by 
Nordic and Mediterranean countries. The index of product market regulation (PMR) 
declined through the period, but the rate of decrease intensified after 1998 for most 
countries. Except Germany, active labour market policies (ALMPs) increased in all 
countries. Unemployment benefits replacement rates rose in nearly all countries.  
The possible short-term effects of these policies are to raise employment, 
reducing productivity, whereas the possible long-term effects are to increase investment 
following the increase in employment, increasing incentives for the adoption of new 
technologies, implying a shift in the demand for skills (Dew-Becker and Gordon, 2008). 
All are expected to influence earnings mobility. 
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Figure 4: Labour Market Evolution 
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However, the institutional factors do not exist in a vacuum. They are expected to 
interact with external factors, such as macroeconomic shocks. The evolution of some 
macroeconomic shocks is illustrated in  Figure 5. Changes in demand and supply 
factors, in technology, in terms of trade, in real interest do not differ significantly among 
countries; hence they cannot themselves explain the changes in the inequality 
components. These trends are not surprising, given that these countries operate in the 
same world markets, with similar technology, industry and occupation mixes. Given that 
all countries face similar shocks, the difference in institutions can potentially explain the 
differences in outcomes across countries.  
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Source: Processed using OECD data 
 
4. Quantifying the links between policy, institutions and earnings mobility 
What are the factors explaining country heterogeneity in the level and the 
evolution of earnings mobility? We try to explain cross-country differences in this 
labour market outcome by relating to differences in the wage-setting mechanism and 
other labour marker institutions and policies, such as active labour market policies and 
income maintenance institutions (e.g. unemployment benefits), and institutional and 
policy changes, such as employment protection legislation, product market regulation, 
tax wedge, unionization.  
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In quantifying the associations between labour market policies and institutions 
and our dependent variable we start with the simple pair-wise correlations, followed by 
complex models.  
Table 2 presents the pair-wise correlations between earnings immobility and 
labour market institutions and macro-economic variables. Given the differences 
earnings immobility trends between the oldest three cohorts and the youngest cohort 
inin Figure 1, it is necessary to account for cohort heterogeneity when analysing the link 
between this labour market outcome and labour market institutional and policy factors. 
Pooling the oldest three cohorts, the immobility ratio exhibits a positive significant 
association with EPL, EPLR and PMR, and a significant negative association with union 
density and the unemployment benefit replacement rate. For the youngest cohort, the 
immobility ratio is significantly positively associated with the relative difference between 
EPLR and EPLT, and significantly negatively associated with the other factors except 
the union density and PMR. The correlations with the macroeconomic shocks reveal 
differences between cohorts. For the oldest cohorts, a significant positive association is 
observed for the terms of trade shock. For the youngest cohort, a significant positive 
association is observed for the labour demand shock, and a significant negative 
association with the real interest rate shock. 
 
Table 2. Pair-wise correlations between the immobility ratio and labour market institutional factors and 
macroeconomic shocks 
Pair wise Correlations  Immobility (PV/TV) 
  Cohort 1940-1969  Cohort 1970-1981 
EPL  0.140**  -0.317*** 
EPL regular contracts (EPLR)  0.225***  -0.263*** 
EPL temporary contracts (EPLT)  0.051  -0.254** 
[(EPLR-EPLT)/EPLT]*100 0.024  0.593*** 
Union Density  -0.245***  -0.110 
Degree of Corporatism  -0.086  -0.201* 
Tax Wedge  -0.066  -0.449*** 
PMR 0.160***  0.018 
Active Labour Market Policies  -0.063  -0.184* 
Average Unemployment Benefit RR  -0.114*  -0.465*** 
Labour Demand Shock  0.066  0.574*** 
Terms of Trade Shock  0.105*  0.102 
Total Factor Production Shock  -0.041  0.163 
Real Interest Shock  -0.056  -0.218** 
Aggregate Supply Shock  -0.014  -0.103 
Aggregate Demand Shock  -0.092  -0.003 
Note: * = significant at 10%; **= significant at 5%; ***= significant at 1%.  
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Nevertheless, these correlations only tell a partial story, neglecting the complex 
interactions between institutions on the one hand, and between institutions and 
macroeconomic shocks on the other hand. Institutional factors are expected to shape 
the pattern and the level of earnings immobility not only directly, but also in interaction 
with macroeconomic shocks, with the institutional framework expected to be a 
“filtering mechanism” for the adverse effects that these shocks might have on earnings 
mobility. 
To explore these interactions, we use a nonlinear least squares regression. The 
biggest advantage of nonlinear least squares regression over other techniques is its high 
degree of flexibility in specifying a broad range of functions. The way the parameters of 
a nonlinear function are estimated, however, is conceptually the same as in linear least 
squares regressions. Another advantage is the efficient use of data, producing good 
estimates in relatively small datasets.  
Given the complexity of the interactions between institutions and between 
institutions and shocks, a systematic analysis of all interactions is not straightforward. A 
model with eight policies and institutions implies incorporating a total of 28 cross-
institutional interactions, leading to a substantial loss of degrees of freedom. When we 
consider also shocks, the matter complicates even further. As a work-around, we adopt 
a nonlinear strategy that incorporates these interactions, avoiding at the same time a 
substantial loss of degrees of freedom, in the tradition of Blanchard and Wolfers (1999). 
Models are estimated independently, with cohorts and countries pooled together. 
The unit of analysis is the cohort, with four cohorts per country, with observations 
between 1994 and 2001
7. We proceed in two steps. First, we test whether policies 
interact with the overall institutional framework, controlling for cohorts effects and for 
all the unobserved shocks captured by time effects. Second, we test whether there are 
any specific interactions between institutional factors and observed aggregate shocks in 
shaping the pattern of earnings mobility.  
One problem is the endogeneity between institutions and overall inequality that is 
expected to be transferred to the two inequality components, and consequently to 
earnings mobility. The lack of good instruments prevents us from correcting this 
problem. Hence, our estimates reflect the complex associations that exist between 
earnings mobility and the institutional framework, and not causal relationships. 
4.1 Systemic interactions between institutions 
The interactions between institutions are specified in a multiplicative form 
between deviations of institutions from their sample mean, as is typical in 
macroeconomic equations (Bassanini and Duval 2006a, 2006b; Blanchard and Wolfers, 
1999). This enables the interpretation of the marginal effects of each institution when 
the others are kept constant at the sample mean. Incorporating all possible cross-
interactions between institutions is not feasible given the substantial loss of degrees of 
freedom. In order to account for these interactions, we build a nonlinear specification, 
                                                 
7 Exceptions are countries which are not observed for all eight waves, and consequently have fewer 
observations.   
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where each institution is interacted with the overall institutional framework, defined as 
the sum of the direct effects of institutions.  
Model 1: 
     (4) 
The parameters  ,  ,  and   are estimated simultaneously:  
•   represents wage immobility of cohort i in year t;  
•   denotes the direct effect of institution   on  , for a country with an 
average mix of policies and institutions;  
•  indicates the interaction between   and the overall institutional 
framework, expressed as the sum of direct effect of policies and 
institutions, expressed in deviation form in the interaction, where  is 
measured at the country level - a negative and significant effect suggests a 
systemic reform complementarity between   and the overall framework 
in reducing earnings immobility;  
•   and   represent cohort and period shifters, which capture cohort 
heterogeneity and all the unobserved shocks that might affect earnings 
immobility by altering the slopes of the direct and indirect effects.  
This complex multiplicative form however can neither be transformed into a 
linear form, nor be estimated with a linear model. It requires a nonlinear least squares 
estimation strategy.  
The estimation results are included in Table 3. The results regarding systemic 
interactions are reported in Model 1. The model with systemic interactions is estimated 
to explain 71.6% of the cross-country variation in earnings immobility between 1994 
and 2001. The cohorts shifters are highly significant, reconfirming the cohort-
heterogeneous trends identified by the error component model in Sologon and 
O’Donoghue (2010a) and Sologon (2010): the older the cohort, the higher the 
immobility. The time effects are highly significant, indicating that, overall, at the EU 
level, controlling for the institutional and the cohort effects, the unobserved shocks had 
a decreasing effect on wage immobility between 1994 and 2001. Thus under the impact 
of unobserved shocks, the wage distribution in a country with an average mix of policies 
and institutions became more mobile in 2001 compared to 1994. 
The direct effects of institutions indicate that for a country with an average mix of 
institutions: 
•  An increase in the strictness of employment protection legislation (EPL), 
in the relative difference between employment protection legislation for 
regular contracts (EPLR) and temporary contracts (EPLT), and in active 
labour market policies (ALMPs) is associated with an increase in earnings 
immobility.   
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•  A U-shaped profile is found for the degree of corporatism, with the 
intermediate corporatism triggering the lowest earnings immobility. 
•  An increase in the union density and the unemployment benefit 
replacement rate is associated with a decrease in earnings immobility. 
The systemic interactions suggest that there is:  
•  a complementarity with the overall framework in reducing wage 
immobility for the union density and the degree of corporatism – with a 
stronger negative effect for intermediate than for high corporatism: the 
more mobility-friendly the overall institutional framework is, the greater is 
the reducing impact of union density and the degree of corporatism.  
•  PMR and ALMPs counteract with the overall framework, in a tendency to 
increase wage immobility.  
As there may be some multicollinearity between explanatory variables in our 
model, we show in Table A.4 in the Appendix the pair-wise correlation between the 
variables. Three variables have a correlation greater than 0.5: both tax wedge and PMR 
with EPL (Temporary Contracts) and unemployment benefit RR with AMLP. In order 
to test the sensitivity of the model to potential multicollinearity, we estimate the model 
repeatedly with each variable missing from both direct and systemic components. Table 
4 reports the results. In general, although not robust to value, it is robust to sign. Some 
noticeable differences where the sign changes however are the direct impact of PMR 
with the ALMP’s dropped; the direct and systemic impact of ALMPs and the systemic 
impact of high corporatism with unemployment benefit RR dropped; the systemic 
impact of the tax wedge with EPL dropped; the systematic impact of the unemployment 
benefit RR with corporatism dropped. These are consistent with the highest pair-wise 
correlations and so caution is required in relation to the interpretation of these 
interactions. Also in a number of cases the level of significance ceases, particularly when 
union density is dropped. These results do not however significantly affect the main 
conclusions of this paper. 
4.2 Institutions and shocks 
This section explores the specific interactions between institutions and 
macroeconomic shocks, expected to shape the pattern of earnings mobility. We allow 
the effects to differ by cohorts to account for cohort heterogeneity. The nonlinear 
model is expressed as follows. 
Model 2: 
     (5) 
 is a set of observed macroeconomic shocks expressed in deviation 
from their mean (Blanchard and Wolfers, 1999), which are interacted with policy and 
institutional factors.  ,  ,   and   are estimated simultaneously.   now represents the 
direct effect of institution   when the other intuitions and shocks are at their sample 
means,  captures the direct effects of shocks and   capture the interaction effect  
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between institution   and the aggregate macroeconomic shocks. The nonlinear least 
squares estimation results are presented in Model 2 in Table 3. 
The specification of Model 2 explains 68.9% of the variation in wage immobility. 
Compared with Model 1, including the effects of the observed macroeconomic shocks 
and the interactions between institutions and aggregate shocks (Model 2), turns most 
direct effects insignificant and decreases their absolute magnitude. These results 
reinforce our expectation that the institutional factors are a “filtering mechanism” for 
the effects of the macro shocks on this labour market outcome. This expectation is 
confirmed by the high number of significant interaction effects between institutions and 
shocks. The adverse effect of the aggregate macroeconomic shock on wage immobility 
appears to be stronger, the stricter the EPL, the higher the union density, the higher 
PMR and the more developed the ALMPs, and to be counteracted by the degree of 
corporatism, the tax wedge, and the unemployment benefit replacement rate. An 
intermediate level of corporatism appears to be the most effective in reducing the 
adverse impact of shocks, followed by a high level of corporatism, which suggests a U-
shaped relationship between corporatism and earnings immobility in shaping the effects 
of macro-shocks. 
All macroeconomic shocks, except the aggregate labour supply, are significantly 
associated with earnings immobility. For a country with an average mix of policies, wage 
immobility is affected negatively by the aggregate demand, the labour demand and the 
interest rate shock, and positively by the rest.  
These findings suggest that macroeconomic shocks and their interactions with 
labour market policies and institutions influence earnings immobility. In order to test 
the sensitivity of these results to potential multicollinearity, we estimate the model 
repeatedly with each institution missing from both direct and interaction components. 
The results (not reported) show similar qualitative conclusions, with similar signs and 
significance levels. For some interaction effects the level of significance ceases when 
union density is dropped, however with no change in sign, pointing to the relevance of 
union density as a control variable.  
We identify a problem for ALMPs due to possible multicolinearity caused by its 
high pair-wise correlation with the unemployment benefit RR (Table A.4): in all 
specifications where the unemployment benefit RR is dropped, the effect of ALMPs 
changes sign. We do not drop ALMPs from our models, as ALMPs are among the 
determinants of persistent earnings differentials and implicitly earnings mobility. ALMPs 
improve the efficiency of the job matching process, enhance work experience, job skills 
and human capital of the unemployed, thus ALMPs are expected to increase the 
opportunity of low-skilled to improve their position in the distribution of lifetime 
earnings. We believe that dropping this policy variable from the model would lead to 
specification error, thus we keep it as a control.  
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Table 3. Nonlinear least squares regressions to explain earnings mobility 
  Model 1  Model 2 
Direct effects of institutions (   Est. SE  Est. SE 
EPL  14.787**  5.416  0.437  0.874 
Rel. EPL  3.173*  1.801 0.898***  0.223 
Union  -17.637**  8.613  -3.881  2.656 
Intermediate Corporatism  -6.448*  3.369  0.069  2.079 
High Corporatism  13.095**  4.463  1.091  1.964 
Tax Wedge  28.619  18.631  -0.746  7.023 
PMR  1.852  1.495  0.127  0.433 
ALMPs 12.592**  5.534  -2.783  2.293 
UBRR  -130.927**  43.999  9.423**  4.258 
Systemic Interactions (   Est. SE     
EPL*System  0.112  0.073     
Rel. EPL*System  -0.005  0.037     
Union Density*System  -1.566**  0.530     
Intermediate Corporatism*System -1.166***  0.114     
High Corporatism *System  -0.823***  0.070     
Tax Wedge*System  -0.718  0.744     
PMR*System  0.181**  0.069     
ALMPs*System 1.863**  0.598     
UBRR*System  0.712  0.434     
Direct Effects of Shocks (      Est.  SE 
Aggregate Supply Shock      -0.19  0.416 
Aggregate Demand Shock      -1.53**  0.622 
Labour Demand Shock      -139.51***  40.93 
Terms of Trade Shock      202.302***  53.47 
Total Factor Productivity Shock      175.117**  73.99 
Interest Rate Shock      -346.24***  100.56 
Interactions between institutions and shocks (      Est.  SE 
EPL*Shocks     0.587*** 0.114 
Rel. EPL*Shocks      -0.003  0.062 
Union Density*Shocks     1.060***  0.281 
Intermediate Corporatism *Shocks      -1.061***  0.159 
High Corporatism *Shocks      -0.622***  0.118 
Tax Wedge*Shocks      -4.682**  1.853 
PMR*Shocks     0.162**  0.065 
ALMPs*Shocks      1.029**  0.444 
UBRR*Shocks     -1.423*  0.796 
Cohort Effects (   Est. SE     
Cohort 1940-1950  1       
Cohort 1951-1960  0.651***  0.048     
Cohort 1961-1970  0.386*** 0.043     
Cohort 1971-1980  0.082**  0.041     
Time Effects (   Est. SE     
1994  1       
1995 0.348***  0.055     
1996  0.546***  0.064     
1997 0.697***  0.085     
1998  0.677***  0.087     
1999 0.677***  0.104     
2000  0.786***  0.129     
2001 0.526***  0.102     
Adj. R2 0.716  0.689 
N   372  320 
Note: (1) N = # countries * # years * # cohorts. The number of countries is 12 in Model 1 and 11 in Model 2. 
 (2) Systemic interactions= each institution is interacted with the overall institutional framework, defined as the sum of the 
direct effects of institutions (expressed in deviation from their mean). 
 (3) * = significant at 10%; **= significant at 5%; ***= significant at 1%. 
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Table 4. Sensitivity test 
Direct effects   Model 1 - no EPL  Model 1 - no Union  Model 1 - no Corporatism  Model 1 - no Tax Wedge  Model 1 - no PMR  Model 1 - no ALMPs  Model 1 – no UBRR 
Institutions    Est.  P value  Est.  P value  Est.  P value  Est.  P value  Est.  P value  Est.  P value  Est.  P value 
EPL  .  .  1.563  0.256  2.238  0.000  14.495  0.000  9.287  0.063  19.056  0.078  1.070  0.001 
Rel. EPL  .  .  -0.205  0.691  0.807  0.000  2.376  0.082  3.993  0.015  9.651  0.068  0.318  0.031 
Union  -15.414  0.092  .  .  0.367  0.649  -8.127  0.028  -20.908  0.037  -88.753  0.096  -1.594  0.007 
Inter. Corp.  -7.371  0.081  0.386  0.788  .  .  -4.716 0.034  6.007  0.229  -16.770  0.105  -0.556  0.048 
High Corp.  6.532  0.063  4.089  0.071  .  .  12.370  0.000  8.088  0.046  24.311  0.123  0.591  0.002 
Tax Wedge  54.148  0.044  14.384  0.150  15.078  0.000  .  .  37.803  0.016  52.315  0.050  5.459  0.004 
PMR  4.724  0.027  2.734  0.047  -0.373  0.114  3.042  0.040  .  .  -7.643  0.075  -0.071  0.641 
ALMPs 12.405  0.031  8.419  0.105  2.211  0.017  17.318  0.000  3.843  0.284  .  .  -1.218  0.056 
UBRR  -74.488  0.051  -40.012  0.114  -12.881  0.000  -123.716  0.000  -75.639  0.033  -18.389  0.265  .  . 
Systemic Interaction    Est.  P value  Est.  P value  Est.  P value  Est.  P value  Est.  P value  Est.  P value  Est.  P value 
EPL*System  .  .  0.023  0.892  -1.289  0.106  0.102  0.170  0.290  0.029  0.084  0.557  0.417  0.786 
Rel. EPL*System  .  .  -0.286  0.136  -2.431  0.001  0.009  0.780  0.046  0.330  -0.123  0.264  -4.689  0.001 
Union*System  -3.196  0.045  .  .  -7.680  0.002  -1.723  0.000  -2.748  0.020  -0.663  0.254  -18.233  0.007 
Inter. Corp. 
*System 
-1.768 0.000  -0.610  0.097  .  .  -1.172  0.000  -1.375 0.000  2.400  0.209  0.189  0.945 
High Corp. *System  -0.587  0.012  -0.839  0.000  .  .  -0.808  0.000  -0.388  0.154  -0.509  0.101  2.158  0.076 
Tax Wedge 
*System 
1.154 0.089 -6.503 0.116  -35.259  0.000  .  .  -2.773 0.169 -7.732  0.110  -70.280 0.001 
PMR*System  0.160  0.025  0.251  0.065  0.284  0.496  0.172  0.000  .  .  -0.124  0.171  -1.232  0.142 
ALMPs*System 2.141  0.035  6.333  0.050  4.181  0.109 1.915 0.000  0.693  0.131  .  .  -1.261  0.657 
UBRR*System  2.008  0.061  -5.842  0.104  -7.126  0.029  0.915  0.018  2.161  0.018  -1.854  0.133  .  . 
Cohort Eff.    Est.  P value  Est.  P value  Est.  P value  Est.  P value  Est.  P value  Est.  P value  Est.  P value 
C. 1951-1960  0.670  0.000  0.672  0.000  0.755  0.000  0.656  0.000  0.676  0.000  0.601  0.000  0.761  0.000 
C. 1961-1970  0.404  0.000  0.400  0.000  0.443  0.000  0.387  0.000  0.397  0.000  0.350  0.000  0.450  0.000 
C. 1971-1980  0.085  0.055  0.085  0.047  0.095  0.043  0.082  0.045  0.084  0.045  0.073  0.070  0.099  0.038 
Time Eff.   yes    yes    yes    yes    yes    yes    yes   
Adj. R2  0.686    0.700    0.678    0.715    0.711    0.710    0.673   
Note: EPL = Employment protection legislation, Union = union density, Corp = corporatism (intermediate and high), PMR= product market regulation, ALMPs = active labour market policies, UBRR=unemployment benefit replacement rate. 
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5. Concluding remarks and discussion 
Earnings mobility is an important determinant of welfare. In this paper, using a 
mobility measure estimated with ECHP and OECD data, we have tried to understand 
the role of labour market policy and institutional factors in explaining the differences in 
earnings mobility across Europe in the 1990s. Starting with early 1990s, most EU labour 
markets started a set of institutional employment-friendly reforms aimed to increase 
labour market flexibility. These reforms led to an increase in country heterogeneity, 
reflected also in the level and the evolution of earnings mobility. 
To what extent do labour market policies and institutional factors shape earnings 
mobility across the 14 EU countries? The nonlinear least squares estimation results 
reveal a complex framework, where institutions interact significantly with each other 
and with the macroeconomic shocks in shaping the pattern of earnings mobility. We 
summarize and discuss the most robust findings. 
For a country with an average institutional mix, the strictness of employment 
protection legislation (EPL) emerges as positively associated with earnings immobility. 
Our findings are consistent with the argument that EPL increases labour market rigidity 
by reducing labour turnover through increasing the cost of hirings and of layoffs (Cazes 
and Nesporova, 2003). The negative impact of a strict EPL affects mainly vulnerable 
groups with temporary work contracts which have a weaker protection in the labour 
market. Additionally, robust across specifications, EPL is found to exacerbate the 
adverse effects of macro-economic shocks on earnings immobility, consistent with the 
belief that the adverse effect of a strict EPL is augmented in periods of economic 
volatility when irregular jobs tend to increase at the expense of regular jobs.  
A strict regulation in the product market (PMR) is also found to be a source of 
labour market rigidity, exacerbating the adverse effects of macro-economic shocks on 
earnings immobility. A possible explanation is that under a highly regulated product 
market, between-group persistent differentials (between workers in regulated and non-
regulated sectors) may be exacerbated by macro shocks, as regulated sectors are 
characterized by a reduced competition, a reduced labour demand elasticity which 
favours a strong capture of labour market rents (Nickell, 1999). Ceteris paribus, 
increasing persistent differentials signal decreasing earnings mobility. 
For a country with an average mix of policies and institutions, relative to earnings 
immobility we find a negative association with union density. Additionally we bring 
evidence of a reform complementarity with the overall system in reducing earnings 
immobility: the more mobility-friendly the overall institutional framework is the greater 
is the reducing impact of union density. This finding is consistent with the view that 
unions affect wage dispersion and implicitly wage mobility indirectly, mainly through 
their impact on training and minimum wage. By forcing employers to provide training 
to their employees, they increase the employees’ human capital and adaptability to new 
technologies (Aghion and Williamson, 2001), thus increasing their opportunity to 
improve their position in the distribution of lifetime earnings. However, we find robust 
evidence that union density is among the factors which amplify the adverse effects of 
macroeconomic shocks on earnings immobility. This may suggest that periods of high 
economic volatility may increase persistent earnings differentials between non-unionized 
and unionized workers, with a negative effect on earnings mobility.  
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For a country with an average mix of institutions, robust across most 
specifications, we find a U-shaped relationship between the degree of corporatism and 
earnings immobility. Additionally, we bring evidence of reform complementarity with 
the overall system in reducing earnings immobility, with a stronger reducing effect for 
an intermediate level than for a high level. A similar U-shaped relationship between 
corporatism and earnings immobility is found in counteracting the adverse effect of 
macro-shocks on wage mobility. This finding is consistent with the pro-corporatist view, 
which states that corporatist systems deal with the adjustment to aggregate shocks, 
increasing wage flexibility (Teulings and Hartog, 2008). 
In the face of macro-shocks, longer and more generous unemployment benefits 
represent incentives not to accept low-paid jobs. Thus they may improve the job-
matching and increase the likelihood of a more stable employment and earnings patterns 
(Bassanini and Duval, 2006b, 2006a), with a positive impact on earnings mobility in the 
long-run. This is consistent with our finding which places the generosity of the 
unemployment benefit among the factors counteracting the adverse effects of macro-
shocks on wage mobility.  
Besides their interactions with labour market policies and institutions, the macro-
economic shocks (except aggregate supply) are significantly associated with earnings 
immobility. We find negative associations with positive shocks in demand factors and in 
the real interest rate. Overall, we conclude that not only institutions, but also 
macroeconomic shocks and their interactions with labour market policies and 
institutions shape earnings mobility.  
The concluding message of this paper is that a number of factors including less 
regulated labour and product markets, more unionisation, an intermediate corporatism, 
better protection for the unemployed and a more favourable economic environment are 
associated with a higher earnings mobility.  
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Table A.1 Description of OECD variables 
OECD Variables  Description  
Source: Bassanini and Duval (2006a, 2006b) 
EPL = Employment 
Protection Legislation  OECD summary indicator of the stringency of Employment Protection Legislation. EPL ranges from 0 to 6. 
EPLR = Employment 
Protection Legislation for 
regular contracts 
OECD summary indicator of the stringency of Employment Protection Legislation for regular contracts 
EPLT= Employment 
Protection Legislation for 
temporary contracts 
OECD summary indicator of the stringency of Employment Protection Legislation for temporary contracts 
Union Density   Trade union density rate, i.e. the share of workers affiliated to a trade union, in %. 
Degree of Corporatism  Indicator of the degree of centralisation/co-ordination of the wage bargaining processes, which takes values 
1 for decentralised and uncoordinated processes, and 2 and 3 for intermediate and high 
Tax Wedge  The tax wedge expresses the sum of personal income tax and all social security contributions as a percentage 
of total labour cost. 
PMR  
= Product Market Regulation  
OECD summary indicator of regulatory impediments to product market competition in seven non-
manufacturing industries. The data used in this paper cover regulations and market conditions in seven 
energy and service industries. PMR ranges from 0 to 6. 
ALMPs = Public 
expenditures on active labour 
market  
policies 
Public expenditures on active labour market programmes per unemployed worker as a share of  
GDP per capita, in %. 
Average unemployment 
benefit replacement rate 
(UBRR) 
Average unemployment benefit replacement rate across two income situations (100% and 67% of APW 
earnings), three family situations (single, with dependent spouse, with spouse in work) 
Labour Demand Shock   Logarithm of the labour share in business sector GDP purged from the short-run influence of factor prices. 
Terms of Trade Shock  Logarithm of the relative price of imports weighted by the share of imports in GDP 
Total Factor Productivity 
Shock 
Deviation of the logarithm of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) from its trend calculated by means of a 
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter (smoothing parameter λ = 100) 
Real Interest Shock  Difference between the 10-year nominal government bond yield (in %) and the annual change in the GDP 
deflator (in %). 
Lindert-Allard OECD data sets 1950-2001 
Aggregate Supply Shock 
At the OECD level, amplified by openness = (INFLOECD-UNCHOECD)*OPEN/100 , INFLOECD = 
inflation for the OECD as a whole, averaged over the 21 countries, UNCHOECD= Three-year change in 
the unemployment rate for the OECD as a whole) OPEN= (exports + imports) as a percentage of GDP, 
from Penn World Tables 
Aggregate Demand Shock  At the OECD level, amplified by openness= (INFLOECD+UNCHOECD)*OPEN/100  
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Table A.2 Institutional Variables - Summary Statistics 
Variable   Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max  Observations 
EPL  overall  2.423 0.956  0.600 3.854 N  =  101 
  between    0.944  0.621  3.739  n = 13 
  within    0.251  1.537  3.211  T = 7.769 
EPLR  overall  2.322  0.847  0.948  4.333  N = 101 
  between    0.865  0.990  4.333  n = 13 
  within    0.057  2.187  2.546  T = 7.769 
EPLT  overall  2.522 1.461  0.250 5.375 N  =  101 
  between    1.409  0.250  4.750  n = 13 
  within    0.496  0.769  4.053  T = 7.769 
[(EPLR-EPLT)/EPLT]*100  overall  0.676  1.683  -0.670  5.413  N = 101 
  between    1.704  -0.553  5.413  n = 13 
  within    0.216  0.166  1.471  T = 7.769 
Union Density  overall  0.371 0.191  0.096 0.794 N  =  108 
  between    0.201  0.098  0.779  n = 14 
  within    0.017  0.302  0.429  T = 7.714 
Degree of Corporatism  overall      1  3  N = 93 
  between       n  =  12 
  within          T = 7.75 
Tax Wedge  overall  0.326 0.068  0.128 0.449 N  =  93 
  between    0.067  0.219  0.404  n = 12 
  within    0.022  0.234  0.390  T = 7.75 
PMR  overall  3.394  1.015  1.133  5.236  N = 93 
  between    0.871  1.454  4.415  n = 12 
  within    0.563  2.155  4.459  T = 7.75 
ALMPs  overall  0.301 0.209  0.048 1.261 N  =  93 
  between    0.188  0.094  0.750  n = 12 
  within    0.101  -0.035  0.812  T = 7.75 
Unemployment Benefit RR   overall  0.360  0.117  0.166  0.649  N = 93 
  between    0.115  0.174  0.599  n = 12 
  within    0.030  0.271  0.451  T = 7.75 
Labour demand shock  overall  0.062 0.062  -0.075  0.167 N  =  85 
  between    0.063  -0.068  0.147  n = 11 
  within   0.013  0.028  0.099  T=7.727 
Terms of Trade Shocks  overall  -0.094  0.040  -0.178  -0.027  N = 93 
  between    0.035  -0.146  -0.042  n = 12 
  within    0.022  -0.142  -0.041  T=7.75 
Total Factor Production Shock  overall  0.007 0.016  -0.058  0.047 N  =  85 
  between    0.007  -0.001  0.019  n = 11 
  within   0.015  -0.056  0.049  T=7.727 
Real Interest Shock  overall  0.039  0.018  -0.016  0.080  N = 93 
  between    0.007  0.023  0.045  n = 12 
  within    0.017  -0.001  0.088  T=7.75 
Aggregate Labour Supply  overall  1.855 2.084  -0.635  8.145 N  =  101 
  between    0.924  1.054  3.692  n = 13 
  within   1.881  -2.472  6.308  T=7.769 
Aggregate Labour Demand  overall  3.388  1.776  1.175  8.158  N = 101 
  between    1.581  2.051  6.578  n = 13 
  within    0.871  0.534  4.968  T=7.769  
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 Benefit  
RR 
EPL (Regular Contracts)  1               
EPL (Temporary Contracts)  0.331  1             
Union Density  -0.437  -0.276  1           
Corporatism  0.029 0.113 0.479  1      
Tax Wedge  -0.022  0.693  0.105  0.339  1       
PMR 0.285  0.554  -0.176  0.269  0.243  1     
AMLPs  0.131  -0.28  0.144  0.399  -0.081  -0.237  1   
Unempl. Benefit RR  0.219  0.047  0.267  0.354  0.113  0.039  0.653  1 
 
 